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When do we empathize?
Frédérique de Vignemont
Institute of Cognitive Science, 67 bd Pinel, 69675 Bron cedex, France
Abstract. According to a motor theory of empathy, empathy results from the automatic 
activation of emotion triggered by the observation of someone else’s emotion. It has 
been found that the subjective experience of emotions and the observation of someone 
else experiencing the same emotion activate overlapping brain areas. These shared rep-
resentations of emotions (SRE) could be the key for the understanding of empathy. 
However, if the automatic activation of SRE suffi ces to induce empathy, we would be 
in a permanent emotional turmoil. In contrast, it seems intuitively that we do not empa-
thize all the time and that far from being automatic, empathy should be explained by a 
complex set of cognitive and motivational factors. I will provide here a new account of 
the automaticity of empathy, starting from a very simple question: when do we empa-
thize? We need to distinguish clearly the activation of SRE and empathy. I will provide 
a model that accounts both for the automaticity of the activation of SRE and for the 
selectiveness of empathy. As Prinz says about imitation, the problem is not so much to 
account for the ubiquitous occurrence of empathy, but rather for its notorious non-
occurrence in many situations.
2006 Empathy and Fairness. Wiley, Chichester (Novartis Foundation Symposium 278) p 180–195
According to a traditional view of the mind, we only have an indirect access to 
what the other thinks or feels through observation and inference. The discovery 
of mirror neurons in monkeys activated both during action observation and action 
execution has challenged this view and opened a new pathway for the understand-
ing of intersubjectivity. All we need to do is to exploit one’s own resources in order 
to simulate or recreate someone else’s mental states in oneself from a fi rst-person 
perspective. Functional brain imagery has been recently seeking evidence of over-
lapping brain activations between feeling and observing the same emotion. Until 
now, the neural basis of the following emotions and bodily sensations has been 
shown to be shared: disgust, fear, anger, sadness, happiness, pain, touch (e.g. 
Calder et al 2000, Carr et al 2003, George et al 1996, Gur et al 2002, Jackson et al 
2005, Kesler-West et al 2001, Keyser et al 2004, Phillips et al 1998, Singer 2006, 
Wicker at al 2003).
Feeling an emotion and observing someone else displaying the same emotion 
activate the same cortical representation. These shared representations of emotions 
(SRE) could be the key to the understanding of empathy. We share the same 
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emotion with someone else because the observation of her emotion triggers auto-
matically the activation of the representation of this emotion from a fi rst-person 
perspective. However, if the automatic activation of SRE suffi ced to induce 
empathy, we would be in a permanent emotional turmoil. In contrast, it seems 
intuitively that we do not empathize all the time and that far from being automatic, 
empathy should be explained by a complex set of factors. I will here provide a new 
account of the automaticity of empathy, starting from a very simple question: when 
do we empathize?
The automaticity of empathy
A colleague feels deeply jealous of me because the head of the department decided 
to send me to a conference that he wanted to attend. Do I share his feeling of 
jealousy? How could I feel jealous of myself? I do not empathize with him even 
if I may understand his reaction and feel sorry for him. However, this seems 
incompatible with recent experimental results about emotions. Brain areas dedi-
cated to subjective experiences of emotions and bodily sensations are activated 
when observing someone else experiencing the same emotion or sensations what-
ever the kind of stimulus that is used. It does not seem to matter whether subjects 
see an isolated body part being injured ( Jackson et al 2005) or a facial expression 
of an unknown person (Adolphs 2002). It does not make a difference whether the 
study emphasizes the context inducing the sensation (Botvinick et al 2005) or the 
specifi c body location injured (Avenanti et al 2005). In all cases, they found shared 
representations of emotions and sensations that are automatically activated. By 
automatic, we mean that the activation of SRE is (1) systematic, (2) independent 
from the context and (3) without the need of any further triggering condition. 
These results argue in the direction of a bottom-up theory of empathy: a small 
amount of information of low level is suffi cient to induce an empathetic activation, 
which would be automatic. As Preston & de Waal (2002, p 4) say:
‘attended perception of the object’s state automatically activates the subject’s representa-
tions of the state, situation, and object, and that activation of these representations auto-
matically primes or generates the associated autonomic and somatic responses, unless 
inhibited.’
We may better understand their claim, shared by many in the neuroscience of 
empathy, if we come back to action observation and imitation. From the very 
beginning, the notion of empathy has been linked to actions. Theodor Lipps sug-
gested that by internally imitating a facial expression, we have direct access to the 
emotion that triggers this facial expression. The existence of mirror matching 
systems was considered as a neural evidence of Lipp’s theory. Gallese (2001), one 
of the leaders of this view defends what he calls the ‘shared manifold’ hypothesis. 
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He claims that empathy and mirror neurons are just two different levels of descrip-
tion of the same phenomenon of intersubjectivity. Action representations are 
automatically activated during action observation, even if the movement is not 
performed by conspecifi cs (e.g. monkey, human or dogs), as long as it belongs to 
the motor repertoire of the observer (Buccino et al 2004). The perception of 
someone else moving suffi ces to elicit the mental simulation of the performed 
movement. Unless inhibited, this motor simulation does not remain off line and 
is physically executed. Imitation is a prepotent response tendency. Indeed, subjects 
make more errors and are slower to perform a movement when they watch an 
incongruent movement (e.g. they move their index fi nger while seeing the little 
fi nger moving) (Brass et al 2000). Even if movements observation interferes with 
action execution, still most of the time we do not imitate other people. Imitation 
is thus automatic, even if most of the time inhibited. One may then suggest that 
empathy is not different from imitation. They depend both on shared representa-
tions between self and other. They are both automatic. They both remain offl ine 
if inhibited. Consequently, several authors have provided what they call ‘a motor 
theory of empathy’.
We have to distinguish between two interpretations of the motor theory of 
empathy. According to a strong version, you recognize the emotion of others 
through motor imitation (Gallese 2001, Carr et al 2003, Leslie et al 2004). Empathy 
is automatic because motor imitation is automatic. According to a weaker version, 
action should be viewed just as a model of understanding. Both actions and emo-
tions involve representations shared between self and others. They obey the same 
kind of principles. However, it does not mean that empathy is motoric, even if 
empathy may share many features with imitation (Preston & de Waal 2002, de 
Vignemont 2004).
I will not argue here pro or against any of these versions of the motor theory 
of empathy. I will rather analyse one of the claims that they both make about the 
automaticity of empathy.
The limits of the motor theory of empathy
How far can we draw the parallel between empathy and imitation? There are at 
least four main differences. First, it seems that we cannot help but sharing 
someone else’s sadness. In contrast, we imitate because we want to, in order to 
learn for instance. Second, empathy has a salient phenomenological dimension. I 
empathize with you if I subjectively experience the same emotion as you. Goldman 
(1995) describes it as an ‘online simulation’. It is diffi cult to make sense of what 
empathy would be if it remains offl ine. In contrast, the study of motor imagery 
has provided evidence of offl ine imitation. Third, autism and psychopathy are 
sometimes described as defi cits of empathy, but as far as I know, there is no 
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pathological case of the reverse, that is, patients that would compulsively 
em pathize all the time with everybody. In contrast, some patients with frontal 
lesion are no longer able to inhibit and compulsively imitate others (Luria 1966, 
Lhermitte 1986, Brass et al 2003). Fourth, many factors infl uence when we feel 
empathy. For instance, we empathize more with people we feel close to or people 
we think are fair, as shown by Singer (2006, this volume). In contrast, we may 
imitate everybody.
Let me pursue further on this latter feature of empathy. At the beginning, we 
saw that it is diffi cult to empathize for a subject-directed emotion (e.g. jealousy or 
angriness toward the empathizer). There are other cases also that raise diffi culties 
for the automaticity of empathy and that show the complexity of the factors infl u-
encing when we feel empathy. Imagine that you witness a mother very upset with 
her son Peter because he made a silly joke to his younger brother Jack who could 
have been hurt. There are several scenarios of how Peter may react. (a) He regrets 
what he did and cries. (b) He does not feel sorry, Jack deserved what he got and 
nothing bad anyway really happened. (c) He does not regret because he did not do 
anything. His mother is mistaken and he feels her reaction as unfair. With whom 
do you empathize? Intuitively, in (b) we feel empathy with the mother. In contrast 
in (c), we empathize with Peter and we feel his mother’s behaviour unfair. In (a), 
the situation is more ambiguous. On the one hand, we may empathize with Peter, 
the crying little boy. On the other hand, we may empathize with the worried 
mother.
If we assume that empathy is automatic, then we would have to empathize 
for two contradictory emotions in all the scenarios, a consequence that goes 
against our intuitions. One could then reply that the activation of one of the 
emotions inhibits the activation of the other. Then the question is why this 
emotion rather than that one. Do we choose with whom we empathize? It does 
not seem so. The fact that we challenge the automaticity of empathy does not 
imply that empathy is a voluntary process. We suggest only that empathy is not 
systematic and needs further additional factors to happen. Preston & de Waal 
(2002) acknowledge that different factors infl uence when we empathize, like the 
familiarity effect. Interestingly, all the factors they describe explain why we feel 
empathy in some cases, rather than why we do not feel empathy most of the time. 
Most of the literature about empathy has focused on the conditions that trigger 
empathy. However, if the activation of SRE suffi ced to automatically induce 
empathy, then there would be no need for any further necessary conditions to 
explain why and when we feel empathy. As Prinz (2002) says about imitation, 
the problem is not so much to account for the ubiquitous occurrence of empathy, 
but rather for its notorious non-occurrence in many situations. The automatic 
activation of shared representations of emotions cannot be the whole story about 
empathy.
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A two-step model
I would like to suggest here that the problem arises from a confusion in the litera-
ture between empathy (sharing the emotional feeling) and SRE (sharing the corti-
cal representation of the emotion). I will now try to provide a model that accounts 
both for the automaticity of the activation of SRE and for the selectiveness of 
empathy.
SRE and empathy
Interestingly, a shift in the studies about emotions happened recently. A number 
of studies have investigated how we recognize the emotions in others based on 
facial expressions without appealing to our own feelings: subjects have merely to 
categorize without experiencing the displayed emotion. Indeed, when I watch a 
face showing fear, I do not feel afraid. There is no empathy involved here. None-
theless, brain imagery show activation of SRE. In contrast, recent studies about 
pain have emphasized the subjective phenomenology experienced by subjects 
while watching the others. When I watch someone being hurt by a needle, I feel 
almost as if that was happening to me. There is a salient phenomenological dimen-
sion of the fi rst-person perspective. In this sense, there is empathy.
As Wicker et al (2003) notice, the strong version of the motor theory of empathy 
leads to a ‘cold hypothesis’, which merely requires sharing the facial motor repre-
sentation of the emotion, in contrast with the ‘hot hypothesis’ that actually requires 
sharing the conscious feeling of the emotion. These two views of emotion recogni-
tion should not be confused, nor should we reduce empathy to the mere activation 
of SRE. By defi nition, empathy involves the subject’s emotional experiences and 
we need to take into account this phenomenological dimension.
We need to draw a sharp distinction between different levels of sharing of emo-
tions. At a primary level, the observation of someone else’s emotion triggers the 
activation of SRE. This activation is automatic and is not inhibited. It occurs 
independently of the context. It underlies the recognition of the emotion displayed. 
But the activation of SRE does not necessarily lead to the phenomenological expe-
rience of the emotion and can remain offl ine. At a secondary level, one has con-
sciously access to the emotion associated with the activation of SRE. It is only then 
that one experiences the emotion of other. It is only then that we can talk of 
empathy. Far from being automatic, empathy depends on several contextual factors. 
Consequently, empathy does not need to be inhibited all the time, it is rather 
sometimes triggered by external conditions. The default rule is not that we empa-
thize with everybody.
I will now turn on the different factors that mediate the transition between the 
primary and the secondary level, between SRE and empathy. I would like to 
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suggest that there are at least two main mechanisms that are involved: the distinc-
tion between self and other and the evaluation of the emotional event.
Distinction between self and others
By defi nition, SRE encode both one’s own emotions and emotions of others. They 
do not specify whose emotions they represent, mine or yours. SRE are intersubjec-
tive. The activation of SRE expresses this primary lack of differentiation between 
the self and others. The lack of differentiation implies the necessity of disambiguat-
ing the representations by articulating who the subject is (de Vignemont 2004, 
Decety & Jackson 2004).
In this sense, shared representations of emotions are similar to shared represen-
tations of actions and we can go further in the parallel between emotion and 
action. The activation of mirror neurons does not suffi ce by itself to determine 
who is moving, because their content does not specify the agent. That is why we 
need an additional mechanism that enables us to self-attribute our own actions: 
the ‘Who’ system (de Vignemont & Fourneret 2004). Interestingly, this mecha-
nism is also involved in the inhibition of imitation (Brass et al 2005). In contrast 
with other inhibition mechanisms that are involved for instance in the Stroop task, 
the inhibition of imitation activates the anterior fronto-median cortex and the 
temporal-parietal junction, which are both known to be involved in the sense of 
agency and in perspective-taking. Brass and colleagues claim that the distinction 
between internally generated and externally triggered motor representations plays 
a key role to prevent us to imitate someone else’s movements. Put it another way, 
I do not imitate your movements because they are yours and they do not match 
my own intentions.
Similarly, I would like to suggest that I do not empathize with your emotions 
because they are yours and they do not match my global feelings and my emotional 
situation. A crucial requirement for the conscious experience of the emotion would 
thus be the distinction between my emotions and your emotions. If one detects that 
SRE are activated following the observation of someone else’s emotion, then the 
activation of SRE does not lead to the phenomenological experience of the emotion 
in oneself. Indeed, why should one feel what the others feel? One can recognize the 
emotions of others based on SRE without having to experience them. The offl ine 
simulation of emotions suffi ces, there is no need for empathy. In contrast, if SRE 
are activated following the experience of an emotional event for oneself, then the 
activation of SRE leads to the phenomenological experience of the emotion in 
oneself. The distinction between self and others thus makes the difference between 
emotional experience in oneself and emotion recognition in others.
If this is true, then we would never empathize. However, we do empathize even 
when we do not necessarily want to. We need a further step to explain why we feel 
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someone else’s emotions despite the fact that they are not our own emotions (see 
Fig. 1).
A set of complex factors
Our hypothesis is that SRE are automatically activated in any emotional context, 
whether one is at the core of this context or someone else. If the subject of the 
emotion is the self, then the activation leads to an emotional experience. If the 
subject of the emotion is someone else, then there is no such experience, unless if 
other factors reinforce the activation of the SRE leading then to an emotional 
experience despite the fact that it’s someone else’s emotion. In this latter case, there 
is empathy. I would like now to review some of these factors that counterbalance 
the inhibition of SRE (see Table 1).
The evaluation of the emotional event is not performed voluntarily and remains 
implicit. The evaluation focuses on three poles: the emotion itself, the person who 
experiences the emotion and the empathizer.
The fi rst main factor concerns the emotion that one shares with the other. We 
need again to distinguish between different dimensions. First, some emotions are 
easier to share than others, like for instance, sadness or pain. I would like to suggest 
that basic emotions are easier than complex ones and negative easier than positive. 
I also mentioned at the beginning the impossibility of empathizing for an emotion 
Shared representation
of emotion (SRE)
Experience of emotional
event for oneself
Observation of emotional
event for other
Self/other distinction
Emotional experience
Emotion recognition
Evaluation of the event
Self
+
Empathy
Other
FIG. 1. A two-step model of empathy.
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directed toward the empathizer, like jealousy. Second, the shared emotion has to 
belong to one’s own emotional repertoire (also called the effect of past experience 
by Preston and de Waal). If you don’t suffer from vertigo, you can hardly empathize 
with me when I am frightened by the void below me. Similarly, the role of motor 
familiarity for mirror neurons has been demonstrated (Calvo-Merino et al 2005). 
Third, the shared emotion has to be salient. One does not feel empathy for weak 
emotions, but rather for strong ones that capture our attention. Four, the shared 
emotion has to be consistent with the internal and external background. According 
to a simulationist approach, we put ourselves in someone else’s shoes based on the 
simulation of the mental states of the person and of the context. For instance, can 
we empathize with someone who starts suddenly screaming and crying with no 
obvious reason? I predict that we would be surprised rather than share her state 
of distress. In our previous example, when the mother is unfair with Peter (c), it 
is diffi cult to share her anger because we know it is not justifi ed.
The relationship between the empathizer and the subject is also important. This 
relationship can be understood in three ways. First, there is the familiarity effect 
as described by Preston & de Waal (2002): we empathize more with relatives or 
people that we know well. That could be easily explained if we assume a simula-
tionist approach: the more we know about the other, the easier it gets to put oneself 
in their shoes. Second, there is the emotional attitude that the empathizer has for 
the subject. That’s what Tania Singer shows in her study: men empathize less with 
people they think unfair. Third, there is the similarity effect, also pointed out by 
Preston and de Waal. We empathize more with people we can identify to. Then I 
can really feel the same emotion as if I were you. The dimmer the boundary 
between the self and other, the easier it is to go beyond this boundary.
A third factor is the overall personal context of the empathizer. According to 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright (2004), women have a higher empathy score that 
men. More importantly, we are not open to others all the time, paying attention 
to what they feel. When all our needs are satisfi ed, we are more likely to empathize 
(Hoffman 1975). For instance, happy children empathize more (Strayer 1980).
TABLE 1 Main factors infl uencing when we empathize
Type of emotion Person feeling the emotion Empathizer
Target of the emotion Familiarity Gender
Complexity Attitude toward the person Level of attention
Valence Similarity and identifi cation Emotional context
Emotional repertoire
Saliency and intensity
Justifi cation
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Other factors may also play a role and need to be experimentally investigated. 
Furthermore, each factor may provide contradictory response and will have to 
be pondered differently. That will decide at the end whether we feel empathy 
or not.
Conclusion
The discovery of SRE has opened a new pathway for the understanding of empathy 
but does not suffi ce in itself for a full account of the complexity of when we empa-
thize. I suggested here that we should distinguish between SRE and empathy. 
While SRE remains offl ine, empathy is characterized by the phenomenological 
experience of someone else’s emotion. While the activation of SRE is automatic, 
empathy is selective. Further work needs to be done to understand the transition 
from one to the other.
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DISCUSSION
Van Lange: A nice illustration of empathy is when people are attending movies 
and empathize with the character to the extent that they start to cry. A specifi c 
instance of empathy that struck me was during the fi rst Big Brother reality show 
in The Netherlands, when one of the participants was looking favourite to leave 
the house in the next vote. A good friend of mine, who is normal fairly balanced, 
said he would be willing to pay say 60 Euros if this person could stay in the 
house: he really empathized with this character. These sorts of emotions are not 
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conscious: there is no analysis of the situation. They just happen. This doesn’t 
involve a lot of cognitive activity.
De Vignemont: I don’t claim that we explicitly and consciously analyse the emo-
tional situation. The top–down infl uences are not available to the subject. You are 
aware that you empathize, but you are not aware of the reasons why you empathize. 
Interestingly, in movies you empathize only with one character. We need to under-
stand ‘why this one?’ and ‘why not all of them?’
Blair: You are making direct reference to the more conscious experience of 
empathy. The problem with that is that we don’t have an experimental model of 
consciousness, so it is not an experimentally tractable question. One of the reasons 
I never went anywhere near this sort of description is because I knew I’d never be 
able to have a computational account of it, at least in the short term. It seems to 
me to be a diffi cult path to take. You were also shifting from empathy not being 
automatic, but the neural response or the shared representation being automatic, 
but we know that this is not correct. The idea used to be that there was an auto-
matic response to, for example, fearful expressions. This has not held up. The 
degree to which you have that emotional response is determined by the degree to 
which you attend to the stimulus that generates it. We could fl ip your argument 
and say that, yes, we don’t empathize all the time, but this is because we are not 
looking at the face, hands or other triggers. These attentional phenomena can 
explain this without any complicated alternative processes being invoked.
De Vignemont: I agree that consciousness is a diffi cult issue to address. Yet 
empathy involves by defi nition a conscious emotional reaction similar to the one 
displayed by the other person. There is a phenomenological aspect that we cannot 
get rid of. And I think it can be tractable by analysing different situations. For 
instance, recognition of facial expressions does not elicit a conscious feeling similar 
to the expression, while seeing someone being hurt does elicit a conscious emo-
tional reaction. By comparing these two situations, we may better understand what 
is involved in empathy. With regards to your second point, in Tania Singer’s experi-
ment, they paid the same amount of attention whether the ‘victim’ treated the 
subject fairly or unfairly. Attention cannot explain why she got different results. I 
don’t think we can explain everything by attention, even if it is of course an impor-
tant factor.
Blair: There are nice models of what attention is about. The Desimone and 
Duncan model gives a great defi nition of representational priming leading to 
attention to particular features of the visual array, driving what the percept is 
(Desimone & Duncan 1995). Facial expressions are much more powerful than you 
would anticipate. There is a huge social referencing literature showing that all you 
need to do is have a novel object in the room, the child is in the room with the 
mother, looks at the new object, looks at the mother, sees the emotional response 
of the mother and this determines how the child will respond to the object for 
cmp12.indd   190 7/21/2006   3:50:47 PM
EMPATHIZING 191
D2
ever more. Susan Mineka has very equivalent monkey data (Mineka & Cook 
1993).
De Vignemont: I don’t say that we are not using facial expressions, just that they 
don’t elicit a strong conscious experience. That is what we are supposed to have 
in empathy.
Warneken: Your process model started out with the person’s observation of the 
other’s emotion and situation, and then went into the shared representation of 
emotion. Later on you had an arrow going to interpreting or analysing the situa-
tion. How much do the fi rst appraisal of the situation and the later analysis differ? 
Or should this be construed as some kind of feedback loop?
De Vignemont: When you perceive a sensation, you just have for instance the 
facial expression of pain. This is the fi rst level. At this level, you do not take into 
account who is in pain or why. This is just the brute observation of pain. It is only 
at the later stage of the analysis of the emotional event that you process the whole 
context surrounding this pain. This processing will be infl uenced by your folk 
psychology and your folk moral (e.g. children have to be protected), by other 
beliefs and desires that you have, by your mood and so on. The fi rst level suffi ces 
to elicit the shared representation of emotion, but empathy requires taking the 
context into account.
Warneken: It is not clear to me that the interpretation of the situation comes only 
later. You could start out with this. Researchers like Doris Bischof-Köhler use this 
to distinguish between emotional contagion and empathy proper. When the source 
of information is the facial expression it is more likely that it is personal distress 
and emotional contagion, versus when it comes through an inference of the situa-
tion where it is more likely to be empathy. The self–other differentiation also has 
to come into the equation, but the fi rst step is already important.
Gergely: There are some potential complications. You have enumerated a set of 
conditions which, if they are fulfi lled, you feel empathy. This may be so. But what 
would happen if you have a bad day and every fi ve minutes those conditions are 
satisfi ed? I don’t think you can feel repeatedly, frequently empathic for a long time. 
Are there further modulating conditions? It is nice that you have pointed out there 
is no compulsive empathy as a pathological condition. But I have noticed in my 
family certain older ladies sit in front of the television crying at frequent intervals.
De Vignemont: Perhaps old ladies would be the equivalent of compulsive imita-
tion for empathy! I agree that we cannot repeatedly empathize with different 
people, but I think we can keep empathizing with the same person over the course 
of the movie, for example.
C Frith: I have a vague recollection that there are patients who you can manipu-
late to laugh or cry uncontrollably just by telling them stories.
Moll: Patients with pontine lesions can manifest pathological crying or 
laughing.
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C Frith: But it isn’t clear that this is quite the same as empathy.
Gallese: Part of the analysis you made is very helpful, because it helps in 
pinning down conditions of activation. It is always a challenge to confront our 
scientifi c results with philosophers like you. You are helping us in downplaying 
our enthusiasm, because as soon as we think we have solved a big problem you 
tell us that it isn’t so big. I learned today that the hardest problem is to explain 
why we don’t empathize all the time. I have some doubt that this heavy reliance 
on the self-conscious notion of what is going on can be used for pinning down 
what empathy really is. I am trying to fi nd a minimum level of consensus between 
your idea of empathy and mine. Would you claim that in order to have empathy, 
a shared representation of the emotion is a necessary but not suffi cient 
condition?
De Vignemont: Yes.
Gallese: So what is missing from this? Is it the selective activation of this mecha-
nism? This mechanism is by default active all the time. To make the activation of 
this shared representation of emotion the neural equivalent of what empathy is, 
then what is missing is the condition of activation. I found some problems when 
you contrasted the voluntary control of imitation with the apparent automaticity 
of empathy. You said we can’t voluntarily control empathy.
De Vignemont: I agree that there is a kind of paradox here. On the one hand we 
say that imitation is automatic, but we can control it. On the other hand I say that 
empathy is not automatic, and we cannot control it! This paradox underlines that 
imitation and empathy follow different principles. Imitation is inhibited most of 
the time, but sometimes we can voluntarily release it. It is more diffi cult to control 
empathy because there is no inhibition that we can just release. To induce empathy, 
we need the presence of several factors, and we cannot control all of them. 
Empathy needs to be triggered while imitation just needs to be released. To go 
back to your fi rst point, I remember in one of your papers you related mirror 
neurons with empathy (Gallese 2001). I remember you saying that at the phenom-
enological level we have empathy but at the neural level we have mirror neurons. 
I think you agree with me that there is something going on at the phenomenologi-
cal level.
Gallese: My point was that we should keep different levels of description distinct. 
We shouldn’t imbue neurons with intentional properties. They are just fatty bags 
letting ions come and go. There is no intentional behaviour in a neuron—even a 
mirror neuron!
Blakemore: In response to your question about whether there are patients who 
over-empathize, we found a recent case where this occurs. She’s not a patient, 
though; nor is she an old lady. She is a completely normal healthy friend of ours 
who feels touch when she sees other people being touched. For example, if she 
sees someone else being touched on their face she feels it on her face as if she is 
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being touched. She has always had this and thought it was completely normal. The 
way we found her was that I was giving a talk about touch and its perception, and 
whether this kind of person could exist. She raised her hand and asked whether 
this wasn’t completely normal. We studied her and did an imaging study of how 
her brain is activated by the observation of touch. We found that her mirror system 
for touch is overactive. She also feels pain that she observes. She has real problems 
with horror movies.
C Frith: So that’s why she is not a nurse!
De Vignemont: That is very interesting. Empathy is a lot about emotions, and for 
touch the emotional component is very poor. Pain is more interesting because it 
is at the borderline between emotion and sensation.
Blakemore: There is a distinction between the automatic empathy for pain which 
doesn’t involve you consciously feeling any emotion or sorrow for the person, and 
empathy where you cognitively put yourself in the person’s shoes. She doesn’t 
report doing this.
Molls: Does she feel the same for good and bad characters?
Blakemore: Yes, it is a bottom–up process.
Singer: The attentional thing doesn’t account for everything. In the last experi-
ment I did, the modulation of empathy experiment, subjects were equally attending 
to the fair and unfair person receiving painful stimulation. The experimental 
condition was exactly the same. The only difference there was their past history 
with them and their value judgement about these two players.
Blair: You are talking about the manipulation of whether you liked or disliked 
the person. The straight attention to the stimulus appeared to be identical, but you 
got a difference between a strong CS association with a much more rich sensory 
experience for someone you liked rather than someone you didn’t. Therefore you 
have a more boosted signal that activates a stronger emotional response. I wouldn’t 
have explained your data in attentional terms at all.
Singer: If there would have been more much more rich sensory experience for 
someone you liked this effect should have been controlled by the fact that we 
are subtracting pain and no pain stimulation for each actor. Thus, your argument 
does not work here either. Another thing. Why did you say there is no inhibition 
in empathy? If you could do a time-course analysis with fMRI, you’d want to see 
whether there is a shared activation of for example pain or touch and then a 
second re-appraisal process which modulates this activity. It doesn’t even have to 
be top–down inhibition. In my data, I had this dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
activity more in men than women when comparing empathic responses to the 
pain of unfair versus fair players. This activity might refl ect modulation of 
empathic pain responses given men had less of these empathic responses in ACC 
and AI than women. I don’t want to do this claim yet because I would have to 
design a study specifi cally to study the Interaction between DLPFC and anterior 
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insula for example using new methods such as Dynamic causal modelling. But 
in principle, you could do this kind of experiment to answer the question, and 
then perhaps you wouldn’t have to be as radical as you are. Familiarity, affective 
link and all these potentially modulatory factors for empathy will have to be 
explained.
De Vignemont: You are right that there is no temporal dimension in my model. 
Maybe there is indeed a feedback loop that goes back to the shell representation 
of emotion and activates it more or less. That could explain some of the results. 
However, we cannot account for empathy with a purely bottom-up process; we 
need the top–down input.
Frank: I don’t think this was a big part of your case against automatic empathy, 
but you made a remark about what happens when we see two confl icting emotions 
in people. Your assessment reminded me of how an economist would look at it: 
there is a utility function, we have good things and bad things happening, and we 
just take the net effect, so you are either happy or sad, not both at once. The sub-
jective well-being writers seem to say that this is not the way the happiness and 
sadness mechanism works. You can experience a happy emotion and a sad emotion 
at the same time.
C Frith: It seems a pity that consciousness was dismissed. In the imaging work 
we have no idea whether we are looking at emotional contagion or empathy. We 
don’t know whether it is the conscious or unconscious bit. I don’t immediately see 
how you could separate them out. It would be interesting to study people known 
as alexithymic, who experience emotions but are not conscious of them in these 
sense that they don’t know what emotion they or having, or even that they are 
experiencing an emotion at all (Aleman 2005). It would be interesting to know 
whether these people show empathy. Do they show emotional contagion? The 
autonomic physiological components of the emotions they experience are larger 
than normal. There is a suggestion that by being aware of our emotions, things 
get damped down. This might be part of the mechanism needed for empathizing: 
you are controlling your own emotions to switch on the one that you think is 
appropriate to the situation. If real empathy has to be conscious it will be extremely 
diffi cult to study it with brain imaging because we should always see the emotional 
contagion. At the beginning you said that nurses can’t be experiencing everything 
because it would be terrible for them, but by the end it seemed you were saying 
that they would get all the emotional contagion.
De Vignemont: There would not necessarily be emotional contagion in nurses, 
but rather an activation of the shared representations of emotion system. Even this 
activation may be less strong, as noticed by Avenanti et al (2005), who had a nurse 
among their subjects. She showed a reduced empathetic activity. Perhaps she was 
habituated to the display of pain.
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